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AN ASSAULT ON THE BUSINESS OF 
PHARMACEUTICAL DATA MINING 
Dr. Michael Heesters, PharmD* 
 INTRODUCTION 
“Data mining” is a term used to describe “the process of discovering 
interesting patterns in databases that are useful in decision making.”1  Data 
mining firms collect information, which is then resold to other companies 
for use in their business.  As competition between firms in all areas of the 
economy increases, the need “to identify innovative ways to capture and 
enhance market shares while reducing cost” becomes more important than 
ever.2 
Pharmaceutical data mining may be described, in part, as the business 
of collecting information relating to prescribers’ (e.g. doctors, dentists, and 
nurse practitioners) prescribing habits.  This information is then sold to 
other companies that use the information in their business.  A specific 
example of this practice entails pharmaceutical data mining companies3 
collecting prescribing data from pharmacies.  The data mining companies 
then distill the data to determine the prescribing patterns of individual 
 * Dr. Michael Heesters, PharmD is a practicing pharmacist and, at the time of this 
writing, a law student at the University of Pennsylvania Law School.  Dr. Heesters would 
like to thank the following people for their opinions surrounding the issue discussed herein:  
Dr. Katie Wang, Dr. Trevor Buchanan, Dr. Bernardo St. Jacjon, and Trent Green. 
 1. Indranil Bose & Radha K. Mahapatra, Business Data Mining—A Machine Learning 
Perspective, 39 INFO. & MGMT. 211, 211 (2001). 
 2. Id. 
 3. Pharmaceutical data mining companies prefer to be referred to as “health 
information publishers,” however, even though this characterization may be more precise, I 
will refer to them throughout this article as either pharmaceutical data mining firms, or 
simply data miners.  See IMS Health Corp. v. Rowe, No. CV-07-127-B-W, 2007 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 94268, at *3 (D. Me. Dec. 21 2007) (indicating that pharmaceutical data mining 
companies have a preferred nomenclature of “health information publishers”). 
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prescribers.  Pharmaceutical companies then buy this information, which 
allow them to better target their sales force.4  This specific data mining 
practice proliferated because it has shown great potential to allow 
pharmaceutical companies to increase their marketing efficiency and 
ultimately their profits. 
As can be imagined, owing to the volatile public image of the 
pharmaceutical industry5 coupled with the perceived importance of the 
privacy of health information by the general public, legislatures have found 
problems with this business practice.  In June 2006, New Hampshire was 
the first state to pass a statute curbing this practice.  The statute provided 
that “prescription information shall not be used, transferred, licensed, or 
sold for any commercial purpose.”6  A sponsor of this bill opined that 
“[d]rug companies are peering into physician’s brains without any 
permission from them.”7  It should be noted that the prescription 
information that was being bought and resold had no patient identifying 
features,8 and that technically once a prescription is filled by a pharmacy it 
becomes the property of the pharmacy.9  Furthermore, the data mining 
companies that purchased this information combined it with data (i.e., 
prescriber DEA numbers) voluntarily sold to them by the American 
Medical Association10 (AMA) in order to “create detailed records on how 
700,000 U.S. doctors prescribe any of 10,000 drugs.”11  Despite the AMA’s 
acquiescence in this specific data mining practice, the New Hampshire 
statute became law and attached a possible criminal penalty.12 
The data mining companies then filed a lawsuit to prevent this 
intrusion into their business.  IMS Health and Verispan LLC contended that 
their First Amendment Rights were impermissibly restricted.  In the first 
trial considering this issue, IMS Health v. Ayotte, the Honorable Judge Paul 
 4. NAT’L CONF. OF STATE LEGISLATURES, 28 STATE HEALTH NOTES:  VITAL SIGNS FOR 
POLICYMAKERS (2007), available at http://www.ncsl.org/print/health/shn/shn496.pdf. 
 5. See Doug Bandow, Demonizing Drug Makers the Political Assault on the 
Pharmaceutical Industry, 475 POL’Y ANALYSIS 1, 3 (2003), available at 
http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa475.pdf. 
 6. See H.B. 1346, 2006 Gen. Court, 159th Sess. (N.H 2006). 
 7. STATE HEALTH NOTES, supra note 4, at 1. 
 8. IMS Health Inc. v. Ayotte, 490 F. Supp. 163, 165 (D.N.H. 2007). 
 9. Therefore, because the prescription is not the property of the doctor, it seems unfair 
to characterize the conduct of the pharmaceutical companies as “peering into physician’s 
brains.”  See White v. McComb City Drug Co., 38 So. 739, 740-41 (Miss. 1905) (indicating 
that once a prescription has been filled the prescriber no longer has a property right to the 
prescription). 
 10. The American Medical Association has a stated mission of “promot[ing] the art and 
science of medicine and the betterment of public health.”  AMA Mission, http://www.ama-
assn.org/ama/pub/category/1815.html. 
 11. STATE HEALTH NOTES, supra note 4, at 1. 
 12. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 358-A:6 (2008), available at 
http://www.gencourt.state.nh.us/rsa/html/xxxi/358-a/358-a-mrg.htm. 
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Barbadoro from the District of New Hampshire agreed, holding that 
“alternatives exist that would achieve the State’s interest as well as or 
better without restricting speech.”13  This was not the end of the 
controversy.  The New Hampshire Attorney General appealed to the First 
Circuit Court of Appeals, which heard the case during the summer of 2007, 
and overturned the District Court’s decision by finding that the law 
regulated “conduct, not speech.”14 
During the summer of 2007, Maine passed a very similar statute, 
except that it allowed prescribers to opt out from allowing pharmaceutical 
companies to use their prescribing information to market their products.15  
IMS Health, Verispan LLC, and Source Healthcare Analytics promptly 
filed suit claiming a First Amendment violation, which has recently been 
resolved at the trial court level.  Moreover, numerous other states have 
statutes that similarly restrict the sale of prescription drug data that are 
currently pending in legislative committees.16  This issue will likely 
continue until states find an acceptable legal limit to place upon the data 
mining companies or a dramatic change in the culture of the medical 
community occurs.17 
This comment will primarily focus on the nexus between the legal 
issues surrounding pharmaceutical data mining and the effect it may have 
on businesses that are closely connected to this practice, by using the New 
Hampshire case as the starting point in the analysis.  The policy 
implications of protecting pharmacy related information, along with 
potential solutions to the perceived data mining problem, will also be 
discussed. 
Part I will discuss data mining in general and the pharmaceutical 
industry in particular.  Part II will discuss the legal issues surrounding data 
mining.  More specifically, Part II will discuss commercial free speech, 
IMS Health, Inc. v. Ayotte, IMS Health, Inc. v. Rowe, and some state 
statutes designed to limit pharmaceutical data mining.  Part II will 
comment on the data mining statutes, the outcome of the aforementioned 
cases, the potential effects of limiting data mining on pharmaceutical 
companies and potential Constitutional solutions to the data mining issue. 
 13. Ayotte, 490 F. Supp. at 183. 
 14. IMS Health v. Ayotte, No. 07-1945, 2008 U.S. App. LEXIS 23701, at *4 (1st Cir. 
Nov. 18, 2008). 
 15. See ME. REV. STAT. tit. 22, § 1711-E, 8704, 8713 (2007). 
 16. Electronic Privacy Information Center, Additional State Information, 
http://www.epic.org/privacy/imshealth/. 
 17. A “dramatic change in the culture of the medical community” specifically means 
that prescribers, if they truly do not wish to see pharmaceutical sales representatives, must 
make it apparent to the pharmaceutical industry by refusing to interact with the 
pharmaceutical sales representatives. 
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I. DATA MINING AND ITS EFFECT ON BUSINESS 
Data mining is typically thought of as essential to the modern day 
consumer-oriented business.18  However, many other entities besides 
private firms pay for and use data that is compiled by data mining 
companies.  For instance, the federal government uses data mining 
techniques to collect information from airlines concerning possible terrorist 
activity.19  In fact, in 2000, the Justice Department and the Internal 
Revenue Service both had contracts with ChoicePoint20 for at least eight 
million dollars.21  Even the American Civil Liberties Union, a group that 
typically advocates for protection of consumer privacy, has engaged data 
mining firms to determine characteristics of their donors, such as “an 
individual’s wealth, holdings in public corporations, other assets, and 
philanthropic interests.”22  Private companies also highly value consumer 
data.  As of 2004, Wal-Mart had approximately 460 terabytes23 of 
information stored at their Bentonville headquarters.24  Target also amasses 
consumer data partly through the use of its proprietary Visa credit card.25 
The trend towards increasing business efficiency and competitiveness 
by analyzing information has led to niche companies that provide analysis 
of the vast reams of data that firms gather throughout the course of their 
business.  The need for this business service has in turn led to production of 
large profits for data collection and analysis companies.  IMS Health, a 
company whose business model centers around health information, had a 
 18. See Stacy Cowley, Data Mining, ITWorld.com (Aug. 5, 2005), available at 
http://www.itworld.com/App/110/050805datamining/ (indicating that consumer focused 
companies with sizable caches of information on current and future customers, such as Wal-
Mart and pharmaceutical companies, use data mining technology). 
 19. See Drew Shenkman, Comment, Flying the Not-so-private Skies:  How Passengers' 
Personal Information Privacy Stopped At The Airplane Door, And What (If Anything) May 
Be Done To Get It Back, 17 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 667, 668-69 (2007). 
 20. ChoicePoint is a firm that “provides information, analysis and distribution solutions 
to advance the efforts of law enforcement, public safety, healthcare, child support 
enforcement, entitlement and other public agencies.”  ChoicePoint, 
http://www.choicepoint.com (last visited May 11, 2009). 
 21. Daniel J. Solove, Access and Aggregation:  Public Records, Privacy and the 
Constitution, 86 MINN. L. REV. 1137, 1151 (2002). 
 22. See Stephanie Strom, A.C.L.U.’s Search for Data on Donors Stirs Privacy Fears, 
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 18, 2004, at A1 (noting that “the American Civil Liberties Union is using 
sophisticated technology to collect a wide variety of information about its members and 
donors in a fund-raising effort that has ignited a bitter debate over its leaders' commitment 
to privacy rights”). 
 23. For perspective, personal computers typically contain approximately 1-3 gigabytes, 
whereas, a single terabyte is 1 trillion bytes or 1000 gigabytes. 
 24. Constance Hays, What They Know About You, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 14, 2004, at BU1. 
 25. Id. 
  
2009] PHARMACEUTICAL DATA MINING 793 
 
 
revenue of $1.96 billion in 2006;26 ChoicePoint, which is a diversified data 
mining company, had a revenue of $1.1 billion.27  Furthermore, QForma 
Inc., a small start-up data collection company, has grown from a revenue of 
$40,000 in 2000 to $2.1 million in 2004.28  In fact, the chairman of Qforma 
noted that he has “12 large pharmaceutical companies as clients, up from 
two years ago.”29  Moreover, as data mining technology advances and 
provides more accurate information, consumer sales companies such as 
Wal-Mart may benefit by instituting efficiency measures, such as scan 
based training.30  Scan based training, which would represent a possible 
apex of efficiency, is a form of just-in-time product distribution, where 
Wal-Mart could theoretically make manufacturers of the products that they 
sell keep the cost of the products with their company until the product is 
sold.  Therefore, Wal-Mart would “never take those products onto its 
books,” and decrease approximately “$50 billion of inventory.”31  This 
would be possible, in part, due to the business efficiencies that data-mining 
produces. 
Data mining not only produces business efficiencies, but it protects 
them as well.  For example, by using data including 911 calls, police 
reports, neighborhood demographics, weather, traffic patterns, and the 
timing of sporting events, the Richmond police department was able to 
decrease robberies at payday check cashing stores.32  Moreover, Capital 
One33 uses data mining techniques to prevent fraudulent transactions,34 and 
Harrah’s Casino uses it to identify people with criminal records.35 
Data mining functions by employing what is generically known as 
“business intelligence software.”36  Firms that are in the business of selling 
 26. See IMS HEALTH, 2006 ANNUAL REPORT 5 (2007) (indicating that 1.96 billion was a 
twelve percent increase over the previous year). 
 27. See CHOICEPOINT, 2006 ANNUAL REPORT 3 (2007) (indicating that 1.1 billion was a 
four percent increase over the previous year). 
 28. Kevin Robinson-Avila, Data Mining Firm Digs Roots in Pharmaceutical Industry, 
N.M. BUS. WKLY., Dec. 15, 2006, available at 
http://albuquerque.bizjournals.com/albuquerque/stories/2006/12/18/story11.htm. 
 29. Id. 
 30. Hays, supra note 24. 
 31. Id. 
 32. See Steve Lohr, Reaping Results:  Data-Mining Goes Mainstream, N.Y. TIMES, 
May 20, 2007, at BU3 (indicating that a twenty percent drop in crime in Richmond 
coincided with the institution of data mining techniques). 
 33. Capital One is a major banking corporation with $178.6 million of revenue in 2006.  
See CAPITAL ONE, 2006 ANNUAL REPORT 8 (2007). 
 34. See Lohr, supra note 32. 
 35. Id. 
 36. Business intelligence (BI) software includes the computer programs and algorithms 
that are used to find correlations in the data that company’s collect.  “Many products claim 
BI capabilities, but the end goal is to let users slice and dice the information from their 
organization's numerous databases without having to wait for their IT departments to 
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“business intelligence software” are considered “one of the hot markets in 
technology.”37  In fact, Microsoft has entered the business intelligence 
market,38 and Oracle offered $3.3 billion for Hyperion, which produces 
business intelligence software.39 
These are just a few of the examples of the effect that data mining is 
having on business and economics.  Data mining is becoming so pervasive 
in business that it has been noted that the only reason a company would not 
employ data mining techniques is if the executives do not understand its 
necessity.40 
It is obvious that data mining is revolutionizing how businesses 
compete.  Moreover, it is imperative that U.S. businesses be allowed to 
compete in an increasingly global marketplace and not be stifled by 
unneeded, over-reaching statutes, which increase inefficiencies without 
remedying the underlying problems that they were intended to solve.  This 
is especially true in the pharmaceutical industry. 
A. Data Mining in the Pharmaceutical Industry 
It is estimated that every time a pharmaceutical sales representative 
visits a physician office it costs between $100-$150, without factoring in 
any free fringe benefits given to the physicians.41  $1.2 billion was spent on 
direct-to-consumer advertising for the first 11 months of 1998 alone.42  
These expenditures coupled with research and development costs43 and the 
perceived failure of pharmaceutical companies to produce “blockbuster” 
drugs,44 implies that efficient marketing strategies are highly sought after.  
develop complex queries.”  The Free Online Encyclopedia, 
http://encyclopedia2.thefreedictionary.com/BI+software. 
 37. Lohr, supra note 32. 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. 
 40. Id. (quoting Competing on Analytics:  The New Science of Winning (Harvard 
Business School Press, 2007) as stating that data mining is “mainstream” and that “[t]he 
entry barrier . . . ‘is no longer technology, but whether you have executives who understand 
this’”); see also id. (indicating that “most companies now have the tools to do the kind of 
competitive analytics that only a relative handful of elite companies could do in the past”). 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. 
 43. See Peter W. Huber, Of Pills and Profits:  In Defense of Big Pharma, COMMENTARY 
21, 22 (2006) (stating that “research and development costs for new drugs can approach $2 
billion”). 
 44. See Stephanie Saul, More Generics Slow the Surge in Drug Prices, N.Y. TIMES, 
Aug. 8, 2007, at A1 (indicating that consumers are spending less on drugs because “as 
nearly every big drug maker watches its best sellers fade away, there are fewer potential 
blockbuster drugs waiting to take their place”); see also Stephanie Saul, Johnson & Johnson 
Plans to Cut 4,800 Jobs, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 1, 2007, at C2 (stating that “[w]ith generic 
competition looming for two of its blockbuster drugs and use declining for its drug-coated 
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Data mining is one example of how a firm in this industry can become 
more efficient. 
The pharmaceutical industry uses data mining techniques in a variety 
of ways, including profiling, classification, clustering, prediction and data 
analysis.45  However, due to the limited scope of this comment, only 
prediction and data analysis will be discussed.  Prediction in the 
pharmaceutical context partly involves using past prescribing history of 
doctors to better predict future behavior.46  Data analysis in the 
pharmaceutical context uses the inferences drawn from the data mining 
research to determine the optimal course of action regarding future 
business decisions.47 
By determining prescribing patterns through prediction methods, 
pharmaceutical companies can see which doctors are writing the most 
prescriptions and what drugs they are prescribing.  A former drug retailer at 
Eli Lilly described the data mining sales programs as giving “[doctors] a 
score of 1 to 10 based on how much they write.  Once we have that, we 
know who our primary targets are.  We focus our time on the big 
[prescription] writers—the 10s, the 9s, and then less so on the 8s and 7s.”48  
By targeting doctors in this way, Eli Lilly optimizes the use of their sales 
force by only “dealing with individual physicians who might give us the 
biggest dividend for our investment.”49  More specifically, Eli Lilly used 
the collected data “to tout the virtues of [their] antidepressant Prozac to 
doctors who favored the rival drug Effexor.”50  Through this process, it is 
apparent that pharmaceutical companies can achieve greater efficiency, 
which allows the companies to “do more targeted marketing, which lowers 
the total costs of its marketing.”51 
This efficiency is particularly important when it is estimated to take 
ten to fifteen years and $800 million to $1 billion dollars to bring a 
compound through the research and regulatory process.52  Even with these 
stents, Johnson & Johnson said yesterday that it would eliminate up to 4,800 jobs”). 
 45. See John J. Cohen & C. Olivia Parr Rud, Data Mining of Market Knowledge in the 
Pharmaceutical Industry, Proceeding of the Northeast Statistical Analysis Software Users 
Group, available at http://nesug.org/proceedings/nesug00/ph/ph6007.pdf (defining the 
various methods which the pharmaceutical industry employs data mining). 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. at 1 (noting that data analysis is “an excellent tool for weighing risk and 
benefit”). 
 48. Christopher Lee, Doctors, Legislators Resist Drugmakers’ Prying Eyes, WASH. 
POST, May 22, 2007, at A1. 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id.  Note that even though Eli Lilly is promoting their drugs, the prescriber makes, 
and is responsible for, the ultimate decision of which drug is prescribed to the patient. 
 51. Id. 
 52. See Next Generation Pharmaceutical, How Effective Document Management Helps 
Pharmaceutical Companies Accelerate Time to Market, available at 
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enormous costs and an obvious need for efficiency, “about half of [the 
money needed to bring a drug to market] is spent wooing legislators, 
regulators, academics, expert review boards, medical journals, doctors, 
patients, insurers, and jurors.”53  The traditional counter-argument to this 
assertion is that putting price and efficiency restrictions (e.g. curbing data 
mining) on drug companies will have a chilling effect on the amount of 
research and development that occurs in the pharmaceutical industry.  This 
may be true considering that private investment in pharmaceutical 
development firms only occurs because investors expect a high rate of 
return.54  Without this investment, small pharmaceutical and biotechnology 
firms would likely decrease the amount of research they conduct,55 unless 
the government made up for the shortfall by raising more revenues or 
diverting money from other sources.  Therefore, even though drug pricing 
garners much media attention,56 attempts at limiting data mining and the 
efficiencies that it produces could significantly add to the overall cost of 
development and the marketing of a drug, which in turn would decrease 
pharmaceutical company profits and may decrease investment in the 
industry. 
Furthermore, because of the highly competitive nature of the 
pharmaceutical industry,57 firms are cutting back the number of employees 
on their sales force.58  This reduction of employees, coupled with the 
competitiveness of the industry, requires firms to maximize the efficiency 
of their sales force.59  Data mining is a major tool for achieving this 
http://www.ngpharma.com/pastissue/article.asp?art=271760&issue=225 (referring to data 
from the Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America (PhRMA)). 
 53. Huber, supra note 43, at 22; see also id. (indicating a perception that “[a] genuinely 
important new drug . . . sells itself" and that “Big Pharma ignores the drugs that matter, 
wastes huge amounts of money corrupting the market, and passes on the cost to patients”). 
 54. See Judith L. Wagner, Should the Pharmaceutical Industry Be A Regulated Utility?, 
24 HEALTH AFFAIRS 289, 289 (2005) (stating a “basic economic principle” is that “private 
capital flows to R&D projects only when those projects offer expected financial returns high 
enough to justify their risks”). 
 55. See id. (holding as false one scholar’s view that the companies themselves will 
spend more money on development). 
 56. See, e.g., Malcolm Gladwell, High Prices:  How to Think About Prescription 
Drugs, NEW YORKER, Oct. 25, 2004, at 86 (stating that there is a “political uproar over 
prescription drug costs”). 
 57. See Evan H. Offstein & Devi R. Gnyawaldi, CEO Compensation and Firm 
Competitive Behavior:  Empirical Evidence from the U.S. Pharmaceutical Industry, 22 J. 
ENG’G & TECH. MGMT. 201, 205 (2005) (stating that the U.S. pharmaceutical industry 
“operates in a fiercely competitive global market”). 
 58. See PFIZER 2006 ANNUAL REVIEW 40 (2006), available at 
http://www.pfizer.com/files/annualrep0ort/2006/annual/review2006.pdf (stating that the 
field sales force was reduced by 20 percent). 
 59. See, e.g., ELI LILLY AND COMPANY ANNUAL REPORT 2006 2 (2006), available at 
http://files.shareholder.com/downloads/LLY/520676294x0x221585/4C4DCB78-EB45-
4D3E-99C0-1C9ADC30A89E/English.PDF (stating that “all of the major sales 
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objective. 
Although the focus of this comment is on data mining in the context of 
the legality and policy considerations of pharmaceutical companies using 
prescriber information to better target their sales force, it should also be 
noted that generalized data mining techniques are also used by the health 
care industry to track adverse effects of drugs, interactions between drugs, 
and vaccine side-effects.60 
B. Backlash Against Pharmaceutical Data Mining 
The conventional wisdom holds that “[d]octors object to gathering of 
drug data.”61  Many others, including New Hampshire State Representative 
Cindy Rosenwald, have described pharmaceutical data mining as merely “a 
money issue.”62  The money spent to gather information is purported to be 
wasteful because it encourages increased Medicaid spending on 
prescription drugs.63  However, it is difficult to imagine how a technique 
designed to increase private firm efficiency, coupled with physicians’ 
ability to both choose whether to interact with pharmaceutical sales 
representatives and freely prescribe their drug of choice, can waste money 
organizations in our U.S. affiliate were newly constituted during 2006” in order to avoid “a 
system built around individual products and overlapping coverage of the same doctors”). 
 60. See Anne Trontell, Expecting the Unexpected—Drug Safety, Pharmacovigilance, 
and the Prepared Mind, 351 NEW ENG. J. MED 1385-1387 (2004) (discussing 
“pharmacovigilance” and the effect that data mining is having on reducing pharmaceutical 
related adverse effects in several countries); see also Lee, supra note 48, at A1 (indicating 
that the data may be used “to help determine whether physicians prescribing a particular 
high-risk drug have undergone required training about the medicine” and that “[t]he 
information helps companies, federal health agencies and others educate physicians about 
drugs, track whether prescribing habits change in response to continuing medical education 
programs, and promote higher-quality care”). 
 61. See Stephanie Saul, Doctors Object to Gathering of Drug Data, N.Y. TIMES, May 4, 
2006, at BU1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2006/05/04/business/04prescribe.html 
(describing how data mining is “virtually unknown to consumers” and “[a]rmed with such 
data, a drug sales representative can pressure a doctor to write more prescriptions for a 
name-brand medicine or fewer orders for a competitor's drug”). 
 62. Id. 
 63. However, Medicaid maximization strategies that states employ to garner a higher 
federal match are likely to be more wasteful.  See Teresa A. Coughlin et al., Restoring 
Fiscal Integrity to Medicaid Financing?, 26 HEALTH AFFAIRS 1469-80 (2007); see also Tim 
M. Henderson, Financing:  Intragovernmental Transfers and Other Special Financing 
Mechanisms (American Academy of Family Physicians Memo), available at 
http://www.aafp.org/online/etc/medialib/aafp_org/documents/policy/state/medicaid-
financing-igt.Par.0001.File.tmp/stateadvocacy_MedicaidFinancingIGT.pdf (describing New 
Hampshire as one of sixteen states that had “some form of local financing matching 
requirement” which is a state Medicaid maximization policy to transfer federal Medicaid 
dollars for other uses, such as, to make up for “state budget shortfalls for other programs or 
to draw down additional federal Medicaid dollars”). 
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by “forcing” doctors to prescribe brand name medications.  Nevertheless, 
the AMA continues to sell prescriber information to data collecting 
companies.64  However, due to the aforementioned backlash, the AMA has 
instituted the Prescribing Data Restriction Program, which allows 
prescribers to request that their information not be transmitted to 
pharmaceutical companies (i.e., “opt out”).65 
This means that physicians now have the option to request that their 
identifying information not be transmitted to pharmaceutical sales teams.66  
This program, coupled with physicians’ continued power to prescribe drugs 
that they alone choose and ability to limit pharmaceutical sales 
representatives from their office,67 would seem to imply that doctors do not 
need additional legal protection that hinders pharmaceutical marketing 
efficiency and is arguably an unconstitutional violation of commercial free 
speech.  Despite these institutional safeguards, some states have acted 
legislatively to protect their patients from the “abuses” of pharmaceutical 
data mining.68 
II. OVERVIEW OF RELEVANT FIRST AMENDMENT LAW 
Commercial free speech can be narrowly defined as speech that 
“propose[s] a commercial transaction.”69  Another definition of commercial 
speech is “expression related solely to the economic interests of the speaker 
and its audience.”70  The Supreme Court has enumerated a test to determine 
whether speech is properly characterized as commercial or not.  The three-
part test asks:  (1) whether the speech is an advertisement of some form; (2) 
whether it refers to a specific product; and (3) whether the speaker has an 
 64. See Robert Restuccia & Lydia Vaias, Prescription Mining Raises Millions for 
Doctors’ Group, S.F. CHRONICLE, July 25, 2007, at B9 (noting that “[i]n 2005, the AMA 
made more than $44 million from the sale of database products, approximately 16 percent of 
its budget”). 
 65. See id. (stating that “[t]he program does not bar the sale of prescriber information to 
pharmaceutical companies; it merely requests and then relies on the industry to prevent the 
transmission of this data to its sales teams”). 
 66. See id. (noting that the Prescribing Data Prescription Program is utilized by “less 
than 1 percent of doctors”). 
 67. See Benjamin Brewer, Stopping Drug Reps At the Door, WSJ, Aug. 16, 2005, 
available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB112405319132212657.html?mod=US-
Business-News (describing a physician that purposefully choose to ban pharmaceutical sales 
representatives from his office due to the increased amount of “unscheduled interruptions”).  
The physician also noted that “[o]ne down side to keeping drug salespeople out of my office 
is that I might get fewer samples to give out to my patients.”  Id. 
 68. See H.B. 1346, 2006 Gen. Court, 159th Sess. (N.H 2006). 
 69. Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 421 U.S. 748, 
762 (1975). 
  70. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n., 447 U.S. 557, 561 (1980). 
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economic motivation for the speech.71  While this may provide a 
framework for most cases, it may not help define commercial speech 
outside of advertising.  The Court, however, has stated that the First 
Amendment protects speech that has scientific value72 and contains factual 
information.73  However, some forms of speech, including fighting words, 
can be regulated by statute because they are a form of speech that has only 
“slight social value.”74 
Once speech has been accurately categorized as commercial, the next 
step is to determine whether it is constitutionally protected.  The Supreme 
Court expressly held that the Constitution “accords a lesser protection to 
commercial speech than to other constitutionally guaranteed expression.”75  
In Central Hudson, the Court conveyed a four-part test to determine 
whether commercial speech warrants constitutional protection.  The test 
asks:  (1) whether the protected speech concerns lawful activity and is not 
misleading; (2) whether the government’s interest for regulating the speech 
is substantial; (3) whether the regulation directly advances the 
government’s asserted interest; and (4) whether the regulation is not more 
extensive than necessary to serve the government’s asserted interest.76  The 
Court used intermediate scrutiny in the application of this test.77 
When determining whether a stated interest is substantial under 
intermediate scrutiny, courts may not “supplant the precise interests put 
forward by the State with other suppositions.”78  To establish whether 
regulation of commercial speech directly advances the government’s 
interest, the party attempting to sustain such a restriction must 
“demonstrate that the harms it recites are real and that its restriction will in 
fact alleviate them to a material degree.”79  The Court has also clarified the 
fourth prong of the test by holding that governmental regulation of 
 71. See Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prod. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 66-67 (1983). 
 72. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 34 (1973). 
 73. Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy, 421 U.S. at 763-64. 
 74. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571-72 (1942) (stating that “the right 
of free speech is not absolute at all times and under all circumstances” because “[t]here are 
certain well-defined and narrowly limited classes of speech, the prevention  and punishment 
of which have never been thought to raise any Constitutional problem”).  This reasoning is 
important because, as will be demonstrated infra, Judge Selya of the First Circuit Court of 
Appeals relies on Chapinsky to determine that regulation of data mining firms’ activities is 
Constitutional.  See infra note 115. 
 75. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 563 
(1980). 
 76. Id. at 566. 
 77. See Florida Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618, 623 (1995) (“we engage in 
‘intermediate’ scrutiny of restrictions on commercial speech”). 
 78. Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 768 (1993). 
 79. Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476, 487 (1995). 
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commercial speech need not use the least restrictive alternative available.80  
More specifically, this prong requires “a ‘fit’ between the legislature’s ends 
and the means chosen to accomplish those ends, a fit that is not necessarily 
perfect, but reasonable.”81 
A. IMS Health Inc. v. Ayotte82 
Ayotte is the first case that demonstrates the arguable 
unconstitutionality of overbroad limits placed upon pharmaceutical data 
mining firms.  In this case, the district court ultimately overturned the New 
Hampshire “Prescription Information Law” that barred the “transmission or 
use of both patient-identifiable data and prescriber-identifiable data for 
certain commercial purposes.”83 
The legislative history of this statute indicated that it was intended “to 
protect patient and physician privacy and to save the State, consumers and 
businesses money by reducing health care costs.”84  The healthcare costs 
that the legislature was attempting to reduce consisted primarily of the 
perceived overpayment by the state Medicaid program for branded drugs 
when generic alternatives were available.85  Furthermore, the Attorney 
General, during the injunction hearing, further justified the statute by 
submitting to the court a report showing how pharmaceutical companies 
use prescribing data to target their sales force towards specific doctors, 
which causes “public mistrust of prescriber decisions, increased drug costs, 
and the provision of incomplete and/or misleading information to 
prescribers.”86  Based upon these and other findings the New Hampshire 
Legislature concluded that the statute will “reduce the prescription drug 
costs for patients, employers [and] the State Medicaid program.”87  
 80. Bd. of Tr. of the State Univ. of N.Y. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 480 (1989); see also 
Greater New Orleans Broad-Casting Ass’n v. United States, 527 U.S. 173, 177 (1999). 
 81. Florida Bar, 515 U.S. at 2380. 
 82. 490 F. Supp. 2d 163 (D.N.H. 2007).  Note that the procedural posture of this case is 
an action by the data mining firms for declaratory relief and a permanent injunction 
concerning N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§318:47-f, 318-B:12(IV) (2006), otherwise known as the 
Prescription Information Law.  See also IMS Health v. Ayotte, No. 07-1945, 2008 U.S. 
App. LEXIS 23701 (1st Cir. Nov. 18, 2008).  Note that this is the appeal from the District 
Court’s opinion. 
 83. Ayotte, 490 F. Supp. 2d at 170. 
 84. Id. at 171. 
 85. See id. at 171-72 (describing a state representative’s testimony that a one-year 
supply of Dynacirc, which is a branded medication, costs approximately $1,047, whereas, 
Verapamil, which is a generic medication, would cost $162). 
 86. Id. at 172. 
 87. Id. at 171.  It should also be noted that while this law may in fact help to minimize 
Medicaid costs in the short term, the New Hampshire Legislature is discounting the effect 
that an inefficient and less profitable pharmaceutical industry may have an innovation and 
therefore drug prices in the future.  These facts were brought to the attention of the court by 
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Contrary to the State Legislature’s position, the New Hampshire 
Association of Chain Drug Stores “expressed concern that the bill struck 
too broadly and, among other problems, would prevent prescriptions from 
being transferred from one pharmacy to another.”88 
The plaintiffs (i.e., the data mining firms) proffered several arguments 
in an effort to save their business model.  First, they argued that the statute 
is subject to strict scrutiny because it is a content-based restriction on non-
commercial speech.  Alternatively, the plaintiffs argued that the statute is 
subject to intermediate scrutiny as commercial speech, and consequently is 
not narrowly tailored to directly advance a substantial governmental 
interest.  The Attorney General, on the other hand, argued that the statute 
does not regulate speech and therefore does not violate the First 
Amendment.  In addition, the Attorney General argued that even if the 
statute does regulate speech, it is subject to immediate scrutiny and passes 
the aforementioned test.89 
The court responded to the Attorney General’s arguments by 
establishing that the First Amendment protects speech consisting of factual 
information,90 despite the Attorney General’s contention that the statute 
“targets unprotected factual information, rather than constitutionally 
protected speech.”91  The court concluded that the law “restricts the 
transmission of truthful information concerning the prescribing practices of 
New Hampshire’s health care providers” and “is not exempt from First 
Amendment review merely because it targets factual information.”92  The 
court went on to note that the statute prevents pharmaceutical companies 
from using prescriber-specific data to direct their sales force towards 
specific prescribers.  Therefore, the First Amendment analysis was 
particularly applicable because the statute “affect[s] both the speaker’s 
representatives from IMS Health and Verispan.  See id. at 173. 
 88. Id. at 173.  Furthermore, the AMA expressed an opinion that “[t]he unintended 
consequence of restrictive legislation is that companies that collect and process this 
information may no longer be willing to spend the resources necessary to maintain these 
data.  Therefore, these data would no longer be available for those public benefits.”  The 
public benefits of information provided by data mining firms include, “(1) promoting public 
health policy, (2) accelerating healthcare innovation, (3)driving best clinical practice, and 
(4)monitoring drug safety and (5) clinical trial recruitment.”  See American Medical 
Association, The Unintended Consequences of Proposals to Restrict Disclosure of 
Physician Prescribing Data, available at http://www.ama-
assn.org/ama1/pub/upload/mm/432/rxamapositionmarch07.pdf. 
 89. The Attorney General also argued that the plaintiff lacked standing to sue.  
However, the court dismissed this argument in part because the plaintiffs are “plainly 
subject to prosecution as conspirators if they conspire with covered entities to violate the 
law.”  Ayotte, 490 F. Supp. 2d at 174 n.9. 
 90. Id. (citing several cases including Va. Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 762). 
 91. Id. 
 92. Id. at 175. 
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ability to communicate with his intended audience and the audience’s right 
to receive information.”93 
After the statute was shown to inhibit speech under the First 
Amendment, the court had to determine the level of scrutiny.  The court 
rejected the plaintiffs’ argument that the statute regulated non-commercial 
speech, and hence should be subject to strict scrutiny, because the statute 
only restricted the use of prescriber-identifiable data for certain limited 
commercial purposes (i.e., re-sale to pharmaceutical companies).  Due to 
prior precedent, the court then applied the Central Hudson definition of 
commercial speech.94  In sum, the court held that “the [Prescription 
Information Law] is a commercial speech restriction under Central Hudson 
because it restricts only speech that is ‘solely in the individual interest of 
the speaker and its specific business audience.’”95 
Once it was determined that the law affected commercial free speech, 
intermediate scrutiny was applied under the Central Hudson test.96  The 
Attorney General argued that protecting prescriber privacy is a substantial 
governmental interest because “the State has a substantial interest in 
lowering health care costs and limiting unwarranted intrusions into the 
decision making process of prescribing physicians.”97  The court made an 
important observation that the Attorney General could not have claimed 
that the statute protected a substantial information privacy interest.  This is 
for two reasons:  First, “most information privacy laws protect the privacy 
of personal information”98 and the state’s interest in the protection of 
business information is not equivalent to the state’s interest in protecting 
personal information.  Second, prescribers cannot claim an expectation of 
privacy in their prescribing practices because they are well aware that this 
information is transmitted to many different parties, including, “patients, 
pharmacies, insurance companies, medical review committees, and 
government agencies.”99  This intuitively means there is no protectable 
privacy interest in prescriber data that does not identify patients’ identities. 
The Attorney General, in arguing that the state’s substantial interest is 
comprised of lowering health care costs, claimed “that pharmaceutical 
 93. Id.  Note that the speaker referred to is the pharmaceutical data mining firms and the 
audience consists of the prescribers. 
 94. The Supreme Court defined commercial speech in Central Hudson as speech 
“related solely to the economic interests of the speaker and its audience.”  447 U.S. 557, 561 
(1980).  Furthermore, the Court in Central Hudson held that commercial speech regulations 
ordinarily are “subject to an intermediate level of scrutiny.” Id. at 573. 
 95. Ayotte, 490 F. Supp. 2d at 176.  The court also noted in dicta that the same result 
would be warranted even if a narrower definition of commercial speech were to be used.  Id. 
 96. See supra note 77 and accompanying text. 
 97. State’s Trial Memorandum at 20, Ayotte, 490 F. Supp. 2d 163 (D.N.H. 2007). 
 98. Ayotte, 490 F. Supp. 2d at 179 n.13. 
 99. Id. 
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companies use prescriber-identifiable data to ‘pressure’ health care 
providers.”100  However, there was no proof that the “pressure” being 
applied to health care providers was inappropriate.101  Indeed, the court 
noted that the Attorney General was not claiming that the pharmaceutical 
sales representatives were using the data to relay deceitful information to 
prescribers.102  Therefore, the statute did not support a substantial 
government interest. 
The next issue, despite the lack of a substantial governmental interest, 
was whether the statute directly advanced the state’s interests in enhancing 
public health and restraining health care spending.  The Attorney General 
argued that prescription data mining makes pharmaceutical sales more 
efficient, which allows pharmaceutical companies to have an easier time 
selling their products (i.e., name brand drugs).  Therefore, the sales of 
branded medications will increase (which also increases pharmaceutical 
company profits), and the state will end up spending more than necessary 
on healthcare costs.  This assumes, as the court correctly pointed out, that 
“any increase in the number of prescriptions written for brand-name drugs 
when compared to generic alternatives harms the public health and 
increases health care costs because branded drugs often turn out to be more 
harmful than generic alternatives.”103 
However, the court reasoned that the Attorney General’s argument 
was a “general claim” dependent upon the “unproven proposition” that 
branded medications cause more injury relative to generic drugs.104  
Moreover, the Attorney General’s argument that prescriber data was being 
used to target physicians who were prone to prescribe newer drugs was 
“unpersuasive” and the argument that the statute contains health care costs 
assumes a proposition that “is far from self evident.”105  Finally, the court 
insisted that even if the unproven allegations of the Attorney General were 
true, the statute would still not advance the state’s interest in protecting the 
public’s health.  The court reasoned, “health care providers are highly 
trained professionals who are committed to working in the public 
 100. Id. at 179. 
 101. Id.  However, the court did note that the law’s legislative history indicated possible 
prescriber coercion.  This evidence of coercion was in part from a nurse practitioner who 
received free coffee and donuts from a pharmaceutical sales representative.  The Attorney 
General did not present this evidence at trial and the court held that there was no “credible 
evidence in the record that supports the notion that pharmaceutical companies are routinely 
using prescriber-identifiable data to coerce health care providers.”  Id. at 180 n.14. 
 102. Id. at 181. 
 103. Id. at 180. 
 104. Id. 
 105. Id.  The proposition that the court was referring to was that the health care savings 
resulting from the statute will not simultaneously compromise patient care in some 
circumstances. 
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interest.”106  Therefore, prescribers are unlikely to act irrationally when 
confronted with the truthful commercial speech that the statute targeted.107 
After rejecting the Attorney General’s claims regarding the first two 
elements of the Central Hudson test, the court analyzed the third prong of 
the test to determine whether the statute was more extensive than necessary 
to achieve the state’s asserted interests.  The court that noted the statute 
does not differentiate between using the prescriber data to target physicians 
based upon the need to deliver factual pharmaceutical information and the 
use of the information to coerce physicians into prescribing certain drugs.  
Because the statute lacked this distinction, it was overbroad and served to 
impose “a sweeping ban on the use of prescriber-identifiable information to 
enhance the effectiveness and efficiency of all detailing.”108  The court 
went further by offering several ways that the state could achieve their 
asserted interests, while not unconstitutionally restricting commercial 
speech.  For example, the state legislature could limit gift-giving from 
pharmaceutical companies, require more continuing education for 
prescribers describing better prescribing practices, or implement a prior 
authorization or preferred drug list for the state’s Medicaid formulary.109  
The court’s proposed alternatives center around the fundamental flaw in 
Cindy Rosenwald’s and the rest of the New Hampshire State Legislature’s 
reasoning.  The court reasoned that in order to advance the state’s proposed 
interests, “the remedy to be applied is more speech, not enforced 
silence.”110 
Despite the thorough analysis of the district court, the case was 
reversed on appeal.111  The Honorable Judge Bruce Selya of the First 
Circuit Court of Appeals wrote the majority opinion.  Judge Selya first 
discussed whether the data mining companies had standing.  The court 
concluded that the data mining firms’ standing was restricted to the data 
mining firms’ specific activities, which included “the acquisition, 
aggregation, and sale of prescriber-identifiable data.”112 
In deciding whether the aforementioned activities were speech or 
 106. Id. at 181. 
 107. See id. (quoting the Supreme Court in Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy that 
“[B]ans against truthful, non-misleading commercial speech . . . usually rest solely on the 
offensive assumption that the public will respond ‘irrationally’ to the truth.  The First 
Amendment directs us to be especially skeptical of regulations that seek to keep people in 
the dark for what the government perceives to be their own good.”). 
 108. Id. at 182. 
 109. Id. 
 110. Id. at 181 (citing Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 377 (1927)). 
 111. Ayotte, 2008 U.S. App. LEXIS 23701, at *59. 
 112. Id. at *19.  Note that this does not include “the use of that information by 
pharmaceutical company detailers to promote particular products to physicians,” which is 
surely commercial activity.  Id. at *14-15. 
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conduct, the court noted that “[t]he challenged portions of the statute 
principally regulate conduct, and to the extent that the challenged portions 
impinge at all upon speech, that speech is of scant societal value.”113  The 
court conceded that the statute implicated speech, but only speech that is 
primarily between doctors and detailers.  This reasoning was enough to 
doom the fate of the data mining firms because the regulation of conduct 
(not speech) falls within “other species of speech-related regulations that 
effectively lie beyond the reach of the First Amendment.”114  It is important 
to note that conduct that falls within the category of “other species of 
speech related regulations” has a common underlying feature.  This type of 
statutorily regulated conduct originates “from a felt sense that the 
underlying laws are inoffensive to the core values of the First 
Amendment.”115  Furthermore, the court defined their use of the word 
“inoffensive” as meaning that the “other species” primarily “regulate 
conduct and, to the extent that they regulate speech at all, that putative 
speech comprises items of nugatory informational value.”116  In other 
words, the data mining firms’ business did not have to undergo First 
Amendment scrutiny because Judge Selya had a “felt sense” that the New 
Hampshire Legislature was merely regulating conduct, and that prescriber 
information has “nugatory” value.117 
The court did not stop there.  In an analysis of a hypothetical, the court 
assumed, “arguendo, that the acquisition, manipulation and sale of 
prescriber-identifiable data comes within the compass of the First 
Amendment.”118  Despite this hypothetical situation, the court ultimately 
 113. Id. at *26.  The court further noted that “the challenged elements of the Prescription 
Information Law principally regulate conduct because those provisions serve only to restrict 
the ability of data miners to aggregate, compile, and transfer information destined for 
narrowly defined commercial ends.”  Id. 
 114. Id. at *23. The court noted that the “other species” include restraints of trade, 
communications in furtherance of crimes, statements or actions creating hostile work 
environments, and promises of benefits made by an employer during a union election.  Id. at 
*24. 
 115. Id. at *25.  Note that Judge Selya relies on Chaplinsky v. N.H., 315 U.S. 568, 572 
(U.S. 1942), to make the point that the data miners’ commercial speech is not protectable.  
However, Chapinsky involves the Constitutionality of the regulation of “fighting words” and 
is only tangentially applicable to the commercial free speech at issue in the present case.  In 
addition, comparing the value of “fighting words” relative to prescription information seems 
spurious at best. 
 116. Id. 
 117. Id.  It should be noted that Judge Selya left the door open for pharmaceutical 
companies to sue claiming a First Amendment violation.  The court stated that, “[a]lthough 
speech, protected or not, is implicated by the Prescription Information Law, it consists 
primarily of communications between detailers and doctors—but no detailer or doctor is a 
plaintiff here.  Therefore, an adjudication of that aspect of the law must await a proper 
plaintiff.”  Id. at *28-29. 
 118. Id. at *31. 
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held that “even if one assumes that those provisions to some extent 
implicate commercial speech, they do not violate the First Amendment.”119  
In reaching this decision, the court applied Central Hudson.  First, the court 
indicated that New Hampshire had three stated interests, which included, 
“maintaining patient and prescriber privacy, protecting citizens’ health 
from the adverse effects of skewed prescribing practices, and cost 
containment.”120  In finding that cost containment was a substantial state 
interest, the court dramatically reasoned that “[f]iscal problems have 
caused entire civilizations to crumble.”121  Therefore, the State had met part 
of the Central Hudson test. 
For the next part of the Central Hudson test, the court had to decide 
whether the Prescription Information Law directly advanced the goal of 
cost containment.  Judge Selya found that the State provided sufficient 
evidence to show that the statute leads to better healthcare cost 
containment.122  He then rebutted the district court’s reasoning123 by 
concluding that, even though some branded pharmaceuticals may produce 
better clinical results, this, in and of itself, is “too flimsy a hook on which 
to hang a conclusion that a decrease in the prescription of brand-name 
drugs would be unlikely to yield a net diminution in health care costs.”124  
In chastising the district court’s insistence that the New Hampshire 
Attorney General actually present solid evidence on the Prescription 
Information Law net health care costs, Judge Selya noted that New 
Hampshire was in the “vanguard” when “formulating public policy . . . to 
deny detailers access to prescribing histories,” and therefore the District 
Court was found “to demand too much.”125  Despite the lack of evidence 
 119. Id. at *49-50. 
 120. Id. at *33.  It is important to note that the court decided to restrict their analysis to 
only cost containment.  Id. 
 121. Id. at *33. 
 122. More specifically, Judge Selya stated that there was “competent evidence that 
detailing increases the prescription of brand-name drugs, that brand-name drugs tend to be 
more expensive, that detailers’ possession of prescribing histories heightens this exorbitant 
effect, that many aggressively detailed drugs provide no benefit vis-à-vis their far cheaper 
generic counterparts, and that detailing had contributed to pharmaceutical scandals 
endangering both the public health and the public coffers.”  Id. at *41. 
 123. Recall that the district court concluded that the Attorney General made a flawed 
assumption that “any health care cost savings that will result from a ban on the use of 
prescriber-identifiable data can be achieved without compromising patient care.”  Id. at *39. 
 124. Id. at *41. 
 125. Id. at *42-43.  It should be noted that it seems inappropriate, over the long-term, for 
a state legislature to routinely pass new legislation that lacks substantial evidentiary support 
(although, according to Judge Selya it is legally sufficient when a state is in the 
“vanguard”).  Furthermore, as the New Hampshire Legislature garners the appropriate 
evidence to support their new policy (which they will presumably accomplish), it is not 
apparent they will alter the Prescription Information Law if the evidence proves 
contradictory. 
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supporting the cost containment theory, the court decided to give the New 
Hampshire Legislature sufficient “elbow room” to find that the 
“Prescription Information Law is reasonably calculated to advance its 
substantial interest in reducing overall health care costs.”126 
For the final Central Hudson question, the court had to determine 
whether the regulation is not more extensive than necessary to serve the 
government’s interest.  To justify the New Hampshire Legislature, the 
court stated that “[t]he Prescription Information Law was a targeted 
legislative response to a particular problem that had proven resistant to a 
number of different regulatory approaches.”127  In particular, Judge Selya 
thought that it was impractical for New Hampshire “to retool” its Medicaid 
formulary to make brand name drugs non-preferred and available only if a 
physician consults with a pharmacist.  Furthermore, the court noted that 
this policy would “make no inroads with respect to privately insured 
patients.”128  What the court apparently failed to realize is that the New 
Hampshire Medicaid system already has a preferred and non-preferred 
formulary, which is segregated precisely as the district court suggested.129  
Moreover, private insurance plans follow the same structure in order to 
minimize cost.  Finally, when a doctor prescribes a non-preferred drug, the 
pharmacist and doctor typically consult as to what other options are 
available and whether or not a prior authorization130 needs to be obtained 
from the insurer.131  Therefore, the court failed to realize that the “crude 
attempt to remedy the compromised prescribing habits of physicians after 
the fact” is the precise system that doctors and pharmacists already operate 
in.132  However, the court tried to explain itself by noting that even though 
 126. Id. at *45. 
 127. Id. at *46.  However, this only begs the question as to why a regulatory approach 
was needed at all. 
 128. Id. at *48. 
 129. New Hampshire Department of Health and Human Services Preferred Drug List, 
available at 
http://www.dhhs.state.nh.us/NR/rdonlyres/eenpjx5ovw5xenxiv65oe5fdha56vob2enswz2bs
mpvjhcgzmcdmzxacx6m4kbcmbhlzg6sn3lh3mywotimde.  Notice that the preferred drugs 
are predominantly generic and the non-preferred are predominantly brand. 
 130. A prior authorization is, “[i]n pharmacy, a cost-containment procedure that requires 
a prescriber to obtain permission to prescribe a medication prior to prescribing it.”  
MedicineNet.com, http://www.medterms.com (last visited Jan. 27, 2009). 
 131. “When a private insurance company or Medicaid rejects a prescription I will call 
the doctor.  Sometimes the doctor and I will discuss changing the prescription to a drug that 
is covered, and other times the doctor will submit a prior authorization form in order to get 
the private insurer or Medicaid to cover the drug.  Either way, under the present system, the 
doctor has to take extra time to deal with the prescribed drug that is not covered by the 
patient’s insurance due to the private insurer or Medicaid having a preferred and non-
preferred drug list.”  Interview with Dr. Katie Wang, Pharmacy Manager, CVS (Nov. 20, 
2008). 
 132. Ayotte, 2008 U.S. App. LEXIS 23701, at *48. 
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a preferred and non-preferred formulary, which is already in place, would 
presumably contain costs, the Prescription Information Law was enacted 
“not only to lower costs but also to prevent detailers from exerting so much 
influence over physicians’ prescribing habits.”133  With this justification, 
the court erratically departed from their cost containment analysis and 
presumably provided a sufficient justification as to why the Prescription 
Information Law is no more restrictive than necessary.  It should be noted 
that the court may have veered from the cost containment analysis because 
the district court suggested several adequate remedies for the over-breath of 
the Prescription Information Law and exposed the government’s asserted 
cost containment interest as merely nugatory. 
The court continued to summarily reject the plaintiff’s contention that 
the statute was void for vagueness and unconstitutional under the dormant 
commerce clause.  In their analysis, several concessions were made to the 
data mining firms.  First, the court noted that data mining firms may sell 
prescriber data to pharmaceutical firms “for research or for recruiting 
physicians to participate in clinical trials of newly developed drugs.”134  
Therefore, if data mining firms sell the prescriber data for permissible 
purposes, they cannot be held liable for impermissible uses of the data 
further downstream by the pharmaceutical companies.  Nevertheless, the 
court provided a caveat that data purchased by pharmaceutical companies 
for research purposes cannot then be used for targeted detailing.135  
However, the court refused to address whether a pharmaceutical company 
can be liable for data properly acquired, which is then used to target 
physicians.136  Thus, data mining firms will not be held liable if prescribing 
data is collected for permissible uses.  However, using permissibly 
collected data for impermissible uses is a violation of the Prescription 
Information Law, yet the court did not address pharmaceutical company 
liability.  Consequently, it is a mystery as to who is liable for impermissible 
uses of permissibly collected data. 
Second, while rejecting the plaintiff’s dormant commerce clause 
argument, the court noted that the Prescription Information Law “may not 
accomplish very much” because prescriber data is permitted to be 
transferred “to out-of-state facilities where it can then be aggregated and 
sold legally to others.”137  The court then punted the ultimate question as to 
whether that information can then be used in New Hampshire to other 
courts.138  Therefore, based upon the court’s analysis, data mining firms can 
 133. Id. at *49. 
 134. Id. at *53. 
 135. Id. at *52 
 136. Id. at *55 n.10. 
 137. Id. at *60. 
 138. Id. at *60 n.11. 
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still sell prescriber information for permissible purposes, even if it is 
ultimately used for impermissible purposes and can sell data for 
impermissible purposes if it is sold outside of New Hampshire. 
Several points of the dissent bear note.  First, the dissent disagreed 
with the majority’s standing analysis.  The dissent believed that pragmatic 
principles should aid in determining standing because the data mining firms 
have every reason to aggressively litigate this case, even in the absence of a 
pharmaceutical company as a plaintiff.139 
Second, the dissent questioned, “how can the majority make a 
judgment about the low value of that speech in deciding that the Act 
regulates only conduct and not speech?”140  The low value speech referred 
to is the acquisition, aggregation and sale of prescriber identifiable data, 
which the majority deemed conduct, not speech.  Therefore, it seems 
paradoxical that the majority can “make a judgment about the low value of 
that speech in deciding that the Act regulates only conduct and not speech,” 
without considering the First Amendment implications.141  Furthermore, the 
dissent correctly indicated that the majority “never actually identifies the 
specific speech component . . . from pharmacies to data miners and from 
data miners to pharmaceutical companies.”142 
Third, the dissent held that, although the data mining companies have 
standing, the Prescription Information Law does not violate the First 
Amendment.  The dissent agreed with the majority that the district court 
held the New Hampshire Attorney General to a higher standard of proof 
relative to prior precedent.143  Moreover, the dissent agreed with the New 
Hampshire Attorney General that cost containment was a substantial 
interest that was advanced by the statute.144  Interestingly, however, the 
dissent concluded that the benefits that pharmaceutical representatives 
provide are “largely achievable in other ways.”145  For instance, “[n]ews 
reports . . . would highlight truly groundbreaking new therapies,”146 and a  
representative from the New Hampshire Medical Society stated that “the 
vast majority of physicians” become quickly aware of any “new miracle 
 139. Id. at *65-66.  The dissent also notes that “[n]othing in the extensive record even 
hints that the plaintiffs were unable or unwilling to aggressively litigate the First 
Amendment issues at stake in the ‘downstream’ transactions between the detailers and 
physicians.”  Id. 
 140. Id. at *71. 
 141. Id. at *71.  The dissent also indicates that “[t]he very elimination of the detailers’ 
ability to use ‘a particular informational asset’ restricts the message they are allowed to 
disseminate and implicates the free speech concerns of the First Amendment.”  Id. at *72. 
 142. Id. at *73-74 n.14. 
 143. Id. at *146 . 
 144. Id. at *151. 
 145. Id. at *154. 
 146. Id. 
  
810 U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW [Vol. 11:3 
 
 
drugs.”147 
The dissent’s analysis misses the larger point.  The vast majority of 
new pharmaceuticals are not “miracle drugs,” which would indicate that 
many physicians would not be aware of the benefits of these new therapies.  
Furthermore, only incompetent prescribers would be unaware of “truly 
groundbreaking new therapies.”148 It is much more likely that a competent 
physician would be unaware of a new branded medication that benefits a 
relatively small group of patients, compared to an older generic medication 
that benefits the population as a whole.149  This is precisely why doctors 
and pharmaceutical companies need efficient marketing strategies—to get 
the correct message to the correct prescribers. 
B. IMS Health Corp. v. Rowe 
IMS Health Corp. v. Rowe was decided before the First Circuit Court 
of Appeals overturned the district court’s opinion in IMS Health v. 
Ayotte.150  This case involves a statute similar to the New Hampshire 
Prescription Information Law.  The Maine statute differs in that it featured 
an ‘opt-out’ provision.151  This provision allows prescribers to file for 
confidentiality protection.152  If a prescriber chooses to opt out, pharmacies, 
data-mining firms and other carriers are prohibited from using or selling 
their information for marketing purposes.153  The opt out feature does not 
restrict data-mining firms from purchasing and selling prescriber 
information for any purpose other than marketing.154 
The issues before the District Court of Maine were very similar to the 
New Hampshire case.155  In fact, the Maine court agreed with the New 
 147. Id. at 155 n.64. 
 148. Id. at *154. 
 149. See Huber, Curing Diversity, 18 CITY J. 4 (2008) (describing how the 
pharmaceutical industry is increasingly producing drugs that are targeted towards smaller, 
biochemically diverse subsets of patients). 
 150. No. CV-07-127-B-W, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 94268 (D. Me. Dec. 21, 2007) 
(amended, 523 F. Supp. 2d 183 (D. Me. 2008)). 
 151. Id. at *24. 
 152. Id. 
 153. Id.  Marketing is defined as advertising, publicizing, promoting, selling a 
prescription drug, influencing market share of a prescription drug or prescribing pattern of 
prescribers, a detailing visit or a personal appearance, evaluating or improving the 
effectiveness of a professional detailing sales force or a brochure, media advertisement or 
announcement, poster or free sample of a prescription drug.  P.L. 2007, Ch. 460, § 1711-
E(1)(F-1) (Me. 2007). 
 154. Id. at *25. 
 155. Indeed, the court opined that “[h]aving reviewed Judge Barbadoro’s well-reasoned 
opinion, the Court concludes that it ‘should refrain from writing at length to no other end 
than to hear its own words resonate.’”  Rowe, 2007 LEXIS 94268, at *31 (quoting in part 
Lawton v. State Mut. Life Assurance Co., 11 F.3d 218, 220 (1st Cir. 1996)). 
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Hampshire court’s reasoning concerning the restriction of commercial 
speech and the application of intermediate scrutiny.156  The remaining issue 
was whether the aforementioned opt-out feature passed constitutional 
muster.  The court applied the Central Hudson test157 to decide whether the 
opt-out statute was constitutionally sound.158 
Upon enacting the statute, the Maine legislature asserted the 
government’s interests, which included improving public health, limiting 
the increasing cost of healthcare, and protecting the privacy of patients and 
prescribers.159  The court specifically agreed that patient privacy, 
decreasing the influence of drug representatives, ending the use of 
prescriber comparisons for manufacturer profitability and efficiency 
purposes, and enhancing the effectiveness of other laws were all substantial 
governmental interests.160  However, the goal of protecting prescribers’ 
prescribing patterns was described as “narrow.”161  The court, holding that 
prescriber privacy was not a substantial state interest, noted that 
“[p]rescribers’ prescribing patterns are . . . dissimilar to the traditional areas 
of privacy” and that prescribers already know that they “cannot prevent a 
host of entities from reviewing their prescribing patterns.”162  The Attorney 
General countered that Maine has a right to recognize new privacy 
rights.163  This argument did not sway the court because the statute is 
“essentially protecting prescribers from truthful information” and “there is 
no evidence that by using this information, the detailers intimidate 
prescribers or that the prescribers are vulne 164
Afterwards, the court analyzed whether the statute directly advanced 
the government’s asserted interests.  Even though the statute was found to 
directly advance patient confidentiality, data mining firms were already 
prohibited from selling patient-identifiable information.165  Therefore, even 
 156. Id. at *31. 
 157. See supra note 76 and accompanying text. 
 158. Rowe, 2007 LEXIS 94268, at *32. 
 159. The Maine Legislature specifically listed the purposes of the law:  (1) patient 
privacy; (2) prescriber privacy; (3) decreasing the influence of drug representatives; (4) 
ending the use of prescriber comparisons for purposes related to manufacturer profitability 
and decreasing unnecessary marking costs; and (5) enhancing the effectiveness of other 
laws.  P.L. 2007, Ch. 460, § 1711-E(1-B) (Me 2007). 
 160. Rowe, 2007 LEXIS 94268, at *45. 
 161. Id. at *44. 
 162. Id. at *39-40.  These other entities are composed of pharmacies, insurance 
companies, patients, etc.  It should also be noted that this argument is very similar to the 
district court’s reasoning in Ayotte. 
 163. Id. at *41. 
 164. Id. at *42-43.  The court also noted that the prescribers are “well educated 
professionals” and “highly trained professionals” who are “entrusted to make complex and 
dispassionate medical decisions based upon a plethora of information.”  Id. at *42. 
 165. Moreover, the court noted that “[r]egardless of the opt-out provisions of the new 
law, personal patient information has been and will continue to be encrypted and there is no 
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though patient confidentiality was a substantial state interest that was 
directly advanced, it was a moot point because the challenged provisions of 
the statute did not affect patient privacy. 
The court next addressed whether prescriber privacy was directly 
advanced.  In holding that the statute “only marginally advances the 
governmental interest in prescriber privacy” the court noted that “the Law 
does not restrict access to the opt-out prescribers’ prescription history.”166  
Therefore, the impact on prescriber privacy, namely prescribers who would 
opt out, is “oblique.”167 
The statute did not directly advance the state’s interest of decreasing 
the influence of drug representatives because “[a] Law that penalizes one 
person for the misconduct of another cannot be using the most direct 
approach to achieve its purpose.”168  The court was referring to the fact that 
the statute punishes data mining firms for the alleged indiscretions of 
pharmaceutical companies.  The court further noted that overly aggressive 
marketing may already be covered under other Maine laws prohibiting 
unfair trade practices.169  Furthermore, the court recognized two seemingly 
obvious facts that may have escaped the Maine Legislature.  First, the 
“most effective tool that the prescriber possesses to reduce the influence of 
detailers is to refuse to see them.”170  Second, the Maine statute will not 
stop pharmaceutical companies from targeting physicians who use the opt-
out provision, which will only make the pharmaceutical companies “resort 
to more general, less tailored marketing, which was the source of prescriber 
complaint[s].”171 
The asserted governmental interest of ending prescriber comparisons 
for manufacturer profitability and decreasing unnecessary marketing costs 
was not directly advanced because not all prescribers will opt out.  
Therefore, even with the statute in place, prescriber comparisons will 
continue and marketing inefficiencies and costs will rise due to the need to 
“resort to more general, less tailored marketing.”172 
The asserted interest of enhancing other statutes received a mixed 
reception.  Specifically, the court found that the statute would encourage 
prescribing on the Maine Medicaid formulary, but that the patient 
evidence that the current practices of the PDIIs [i.e. data mining firms] and the 
pharmaceutical companies have had or realistically could have any effect on patient 
confidentiality.”  Id. at *48. 
 166. Id. at *49-50. 
 167. Id. at *49. 
 168. Id. at *54. 
 169. Id. at *53.  In fact, the Maine unfair trade practices statute was used to stop 
inappropriate marketing of the drug Oxycontin.  Id. 
 170. Id. at *50. 
 171. Id. at *52. 
 172. Id. 
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confidentiality statutes were unlikely to be affected.173  For many other 
laws which the legislature claimed would see enhanced effectiveness, the 
court simply did not have enough evidence to pass judgment.174 
In summary, the court determined that the statute directly advanced 
the government’s interest in advancing utilization of the Maine Medicaid 
formulary.  The court rejected the Attorney General’s arguments that the 
statute advanced the state’s interests of prescriber privacy, the influence of 
drug representatives, prescriber comparisons, and marketing costs.175  The 
court also held that patient privacy was unaffected by the new law because 
patients were already adequately protected.176 
Finally, the court analyzed whether the statute was narrowly tailored 
to meet its stated objectives.177  First, patient and prescriber privacy was 
discussed.  It was once again emphasized that the patient confidentiality 
protections were “redundant” because of other laws providing the same 
protection.178  Moreover, the patient confidentiality provisions were not 
being challenged by the plaintiffs, and “once the patient confidentiality 
provision is excluded, the provisions of the Law that are constitutionally 
challenged prohibit the sale of prescriber information, not patient specific 
information, for marketing purposes.”179  As for prescriber privacy, the 
statute did not prevent dissemination of prescriber information; it merely 
prevented one type of entity (i.e., pharmaceutical companies) from having 
access to this information.180  Therefore, the statute did not serve the 
purpose for which it was intended. 
Second, the statute was found to be more extensive than necessary 
regarding the need to decrease the influence of drug company 
representatives and to end the use of prescriber comparisons relating to 
manufacturer profitability and marketing costs.181  The court stated that 
“[t]he Maine Law does not, however, ‘discriminate between beneficial 
detailing and harmful detailing.’”182  Furthermore, “[t]he law does not 
prevent a detailer from giving gifts, even expensive gifts, to prescribers, 
whether they opt out or not.”183  This implies that the alleged influence of 
 173. Id. at *57. 
 174. Id. 
 175. Id. at *62 
 176. Id.at *57. 
 177. Id. 
 178. Id. 
 179. Id. at *58. 
 180. Id. 
 181. Id. at *62. 
 182. Id. at *63 (quoting in part Ayotte 490 F. Supp. 2d at 182).  The court noted further 
that “because some detailing is harmful and increases costs, the Law allows the restriction 
of the use of truthful information that can be applied for beneficial and cost effective 
detailing.”  Id. 
 183. Id. at *58-59. 
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drug company representatives could be lessened by measures outlawing 
specific sales practices that are particularly egregious.184  By doing so, the 
Maine Legislature would achieve the same goal of minimizing 
pharmaceutical company influence over physician prescribing, without 
restricting commercial free speech. 
Then the court proceeded to discuss the statute’s impact.  The 
plaintiffs argued that the cost of complying with the statute will be 
“hundreds of thousands of dollars” and that “about 10,000 hours” had 
already been expended to comply.185  In addition, once in compliance, 
doctors who opt out under the statute may be omitted from data collected 
by the plaintiffs for investigative and regulatory purposes.186  The Maine 
Legislature apparently thought that the plaintiffs would continue collecting 
information on all prescribers but differentiated between the information 
sold for marketing purposes and the information sold for regulatory and 
investigative purposes or both.  However, due to the increased cost to the 
data mining firms, “the likelihood also increases that the [plaintiffs] will 
not collect any data on opt-out prescribers.”187  The Maine Attorney 
General argued that this is irrelevant because of the small number of 
doctors that practice in Maine relative to the rest of the country.188  Despite 
this shortsighted argument, the court correctly noted that even though the 
national impact would be slight, “the potential impact within the state of 
Maine itself would be significant.”189  Therefore, the court held that the 
statute would have a significant impact on the data mining firms and that 
the opt-out provision does not affect the constitutionality of the statute 
relative the New Hampshire Prescription Information Law. 
 184. In fact, the court specifically indicated that Maine may consider enacting statutes 
that restrict pharmaceutical sales representatives from giving free gifts to doctors.  See id. at 
*59. 
 185. Id. at 67. 
 186. See FDA NEWS RELEASE, FDA and Lincoln Technologies, Inc. to Collaborate on 
Developing Tools for Safety Data Mining, May 1, 2003, available at 
http://www.fda.gov/bbs/topics/NEWS/2003/NEW00899.html (describing how the FDA will 
use data mining techniques to extract safety information concerning drug related adverse 
effect patterns); see also IMS HEALTH PRESS RELEASE, IMS HEALTH ACQUIRES DATA NICHE 
ASSOCIATES; COMBINATION CREATES COMPREHENSIVE SOURCE OF PRESCRIPTION INFO FOR 
MEDICAID AND MANAGED CARE MARKETS, March 3, 2003, available at 
http://www.imshealth.com (follow “Press Room” hyperlink; then follow “News Releases” 
hyperlink; then follow “March 3, 2003” hyperlink) (detailing IMS Health’s acquisition of a 
smaller data mining firm that specializes in validating government-mandated rebates). 
 187. See Rowe, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 94268, at *71. 
 188. However, it seems unlikely that patients who reside and use physicians located in 
Maine would feel the same way. 
 189. Id.  Moreover, it seems unlikely that the Maine Legislature intended adverse 
reaction data to not be collected from residents of Maine, despite the Attorney General’s 
argument. 
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C. Potential Statutes Affecting Commercial Free Speech 
Several other states are considering restricting data mining firms from 
having access to certain healthcare information.  For example, the New 
York Legislature has a bill in committee that prohibits the sale of 
prescription information that identifies either patients or prescribers.190  A 
Texas state senator offered a bill modeled after the New Hampshire statute, 
but this law did not make it out of committee.191  Illinois also has a similar 
bill that is stuck in the Rules Committee as of March 2007.192  Other states 
that have statutes pending include Arizona,193 Kansas,194 Maryland,195 
Massachusetts,196 Nevada,197 Rhode Island,198 Vermont,199 Washington,200 
and West Virginia.201 
Many of the statutes are stalled in their respective state legislatures.  
This may be due in part to the state legislatures awaiting the final 
disposition of the two cases previously discussed.  However, now that First 
Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the New Hampshire Prescription 
Information Law, it is only a matter of time before other states enact 
unneeded regulation that will decrease the efficiency of pharmaceutical 
marketing in an attempt to control an uncontrollable activity. 
III. LIMITATIONS ON SELLING PRESCRIPTION INFORMATION INHIBITS 
SPEECH AND WILL ADVERSELY AFFECT THE HEALTHCARE INDUSTRY 
Laws that restrain prescription information inhibit commercial free 
speech.  Notwithstanding the First Circuit Court of Appeals, two 
independent district courts have determined that statutes that prevent the 
sale of non-patient specific prescription information are unconstitutional.  
 190. S.B. A07645, State Assem. (N.Y. 2007).  As of February 2009, the bill was in the 
ways and means committee. 
 191. S.B. 1620, 80th  Leg. (Tx. 2007) available at 
http://www.legis.state.tx.us/tlodocs/80R/billtext/html/SB01620I.htm; see also Minutes of the 
S. Comm. on Health & Human Svcs (April 24, 2007), available at 
http://www.legis.state.tx.us/tlodocs/80R/minutes/html/C6102007042409001.HTM; TEXAS 
HEALTHCARE & BIOSCIENCE INSTITUTE, 80TH LEGISLATURE END OF SESSION SUMMARY, 
available at http://biodfw.com/portals/0/EndofSessionReport80thSession.pdf (stating that 
Senate Bill 1620 “died in committee”). 
 192. H.B. 1459, 95th Gen. Assem. (Ill. 2007). 
 193. S.B. 1518, 48th Leg. (Ariz. 2007). 
 194. S.B. 229, 2007 Leg. Sess. (Kan. 2007). 
 195. S.B. 266, 2007 Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Md. 2007). 
 196. H.B. 1005, 2007-2008 Sess. (Mass 2007). 
 197. S.B. 231, 74th Leg. (Nev. 2007). 
 198. S.B. 0653, 2007 Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (R.I. 2007). 
 199. H.B. 92, 2007 Gen. Assem. (Vt. 2007). 
 200. H.B. 1850, 60th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2007). 
 201. S.B. 434, 2007 Reg. Sess. (W.Va. 2007). 
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First, the prescription drug information collected by data mining firms is 
factual,202 and “related solely to the economic interests of the speaker and 
its audience.”203  Admittedly, the Supreme Court has used varying 
definitions of commercial free speech, but prescriber-identifiable 
prescription information is precisely the information that has economic 
value to prescription data miners.  Therefore, data mining firms target the 
sale of prescriber identifiable information to firms that purchase it for 
completely economic reasons.  Without prescriber identification, the 
information would be worth much less to pharmaceutical companies, and 
the economic interests of the speaker (i.e., the data mining firms), and the 
audience (the pharmaceutical companies) would be inhibited.  Furthermore, 
even though the First Circuit Court of Appeals determined that the New 
Hampshire statute regulated conduct and not speech, the appellate court’s 
opinion was supposedly limited to only the data mining firms’ actual use of 
the information (which includes aggregation, compilation and transfer of 
such information).  Therefore, inhibition of the use of the information by 
pharmaceutical companies and individual detailers may, and is likely, to be 
considered a restraint on commercial speech. 
Even if prescription data is considered commercial speech, it does not 
necessarily follow that it deserves constitutional protection.204  Commercial 
speech may be regulated if there is a substantial interest and the regulatory 
technique is proportional to that interest.205  Furthermore, “if the 
governmental interest could be served as well by a more limited restriction 
on commercial speech, the excessive restrictions cannot survive.”206 
Data mining firms have a protectable interest because state legislatures 
that enacted the aforementioned statutes arguably did not articulate 
sufficiently important interests (i.e., ends) to justify the overbroad means 
(i.e., the statutes).207  Both the New Hampshire and Maine Legislatures 
claimed that they were instituting restrictions upon pharmaceutical data 
mining in an effort to reduce the expenses of their Medicaid programs.  At 
first glance, as the First Circuit Court of Appeals decided, the statutes may 
reduce healthcare costs.208  However, another way to achieve the same 
 202. See Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 763-64 (describing commercial free 
speech as having a factual aspect). 
 203. Central Hudson, 474 U.S. at 661. 
 204. See id. at 563 (noting that commercial speech receives less protection relative to 
other types of speech under the First Amendment). 
 205. Id. at 564. 
 206. Id. 
 207. This is meant to imply that the states’ stated interests were, for the most part, 
substantial, but the statutes in question were significantly broader then necessary to achieve 
the same policy endpoints. 
 208. This is primarily because if the statute works as planned, fewer brand name drugs 
will be prescribed.  Therefore, the savings will result from the difference between the price 
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outcome would be to have a Medicaid formulary composed primarily of 
generic drugs and mandate prior authorizations on whichever branded 
drugs were offensive to the Legislatures.209  More importantly, it is less 
burdensome for those physicians who wish to keep pharmaceutical sales 
representatives from visiting them to merely refuse to see them.210  For 
example, Cindy Rosenwald, the sponsor of the New Hampshire legislation, 
is married to a cardiologist who apparently “had long known that he was 
being targeted specifically by drug representatives to change his 
prescribing habits.”211  As a cardiologist being “targeted” it seems 
reasonable that excluding pharmaceutical sales representatives from his 
practice would produce a less intrusive result relative to passage of an 
arguably unconstitutional statute that will make pharmaceutical sales even 
less “targeted” and more chaotic.212  It should also be noted that any 
competent prescriber would not be coerced by free coffee and donuts from 
a pharmaceutical sales representative.213  Therefore, cardiologists, along 
of the brand name drugs promoted by the pharmaceutical companies and the generic drugs 
that the doctors would prescribe in their place.  This savings is conditioned on the 
assumption that if physicians are subject to less advertising of brand name drugs, they will 
prescribe generic drugs, but it is also possible that physicians will merely prescribe other 
brand name drugs. 
 209. See Mark V. Siracuse & Phillip J. Vuchetich, Impact of Medicaid Prior 
Authorization Requirement for COX-2 Inhibitor Drugs In Nebraska, 43 HEALTH SERVICES 
RES. 435, 445-48 (2008) (indicating that a Medicaid prior authorization program 
successfully reduced prescription expenditures on COX-2 inhibitors).  It should be noted 
that Maine is already employing “prior authorization as an incentive or a leverage device for 
extracting supplemental rebates from manufacturers.”  Jagan Nicholas Ranjan, Medicaid 
and the Unconstitutional Dimensions of Prior Authorization, 101 MICH. L. REV. 602, 603 
(2002). 
 210. Furthermore, residency programs can limit access of pharmaceutical sales 
representatives from meeting with the residents or institute greater prescribing controls upon 
their residents.  See Peter J. Peraud & Eric B. Kulstad, Another Resident Perspective:  
Resident Education and the Pharmaceutical Industry, 45 ANNALS OF EMERGENCY MED. 32, 
33 (2005) (indicating that the “restriction or prohibition of pharmaceutical company 
representatives is based on ethical standards,” but that this is a “paternalistic view” because 
“research shows little difference in the degree of industry influence on residents versus 
faculty”). 
 211. Sean Flynn, The Constitutional Battle Over State Regulation of Data Mining, THE 
PRESCRIPTION PROJECT LEGAL ANALYSIS (August 30, 2007) available at 
http://www.wcl.american.edu/pijip/reglation_of_prescription.cfm (search for article under 
PIJIP documents). 
 212. See Rowe, 2007 Lexis 94268, at *50-51 (indicating both that “the most effective 
tool that the prescriber possesses to reduce the influence of detailers is to refuse to see them” 
and that a prohibition on sales of prescriber information “does not prevent the 
pharmaceutical companies from marketing their products and the companies may resort to 
more general, less tailored marketing”). 
 213. But see supra note 101 (noting that there may have been evidence available, but not 
presented in Ayotte, that a nurse practitioner was coerced by coffee and donuts).  Moreover, 
if a prescriber is allowing himself or herself to be coerced by mere coffee and donuts, the 
primary issue seems to be with the prescriber and not the pharmaceutical companies. 
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with most other doctors, may experience even more visits from sales 
representatives if the “privacy” statute is upheld.  This is precisely due to 
the shortsightedness of legislation that does not prevent sales 
representatives’ visits, but prevents access to doctors’ prescribing patterns.  
Without access to sufficient information, the pharmaceutical industry may 
resort to indiscriminate canvassing of all doctors in a particular geographic 
area, instead of only sending sales representatives to specific doctors.214  
Moreover, despite Cindy Rosenwald’s opinion, the AMA has warned of the 
possible negative externalities associated with statutes that limit 
pharmaceutical data mining.  Specifically, the AMA has expressed their 
opinion that “[r]estrictions on the use of prescription information could 
disrupt health care research and its corresponding benefits for patients, 
government agencies, health planners, academicians, businesses and 
others,” and that it is important to “not confuse confidential patient data 
with physician prescribing data.”215 
Another problem with the Maine statute, as noted in Rowe, is that 
pharmaceutical companies can bypass the statute by simply paying 
prescribers to not opt out.216  Therefore, if pharmaceutical companies 
instituted this practice, it is probable that only prescribers that found 
themselves excessively besieged by sales representatives would opt out.  
This is yet another reason why the statute is overbroad and arguably 
unconstitutional. 
Proponents of anti-pharmaceutical data mining legislation also fail to 
realize the alleged influence of sales representatives is diminishing, without 
statutory manipulation, due to the changing dynamics of the 
pharmaceutical marketing industry.  For example, pharmaceutical firms are 
already reducing their generalized marketing effort directly to physicians.  
This is due to several non-regulatory factors, including the increasing 
influence of payers, expiring patents, fewer new drugs with broad 
indications, and more specialty drugs.217  This is even more evidence that 
Cindy Rosenwald’s legislation was, like so much other unneeded 
 214. The court noted the potential for this wasteful effect in Rowe. 2007 Lexis 94268, at 
*50-51. 
 215. See American Medical Association, The Unintended Consequences of Proposals to 
Restrict Disclosure of Physician Prescribing Data, available at http://www.ama-
assn.org/ama1/pub/upload/mm/432/rxamapositionmarch07.pdf (stating further that “[t]he 
AMA believes that physician prescribing data do not undermine patient confidentiality laws 
because all patient data have been de-identified prior to collection and aggregation of this 
information”). 
 216. Rowe, 2007 Lexis 94268, at *54 n.30. 
 217. Michael Steiner et al., The Continuing Evolution of the Pharmaceutical Industry:  
Career Challenges and Opportunities, Regent Atlantic Capital White Paper, 1, 3-4 (Dec. 
2007), available at 
http://www.pharmawealthmanager.com/pdf/Pharma%20Paper%20ADVANCE%20PUBLIC
%20COPY%20Nov-30-2007.pdf. 
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regulation, too late. 
One final point bears noting.  As healthcare receives more and more 
attention,218 it is increasingly important for the federal government and 
individual state legislatures to refrain from infringing on the rights of 
businesses that provide healthcare services in a hasty or ill-conceived 
manner.219  The statutes discussed in this paper exemplify how a good 
policy objective (i.e., the need to control healthcare costs) can be followed 
by overzealous attempts at mitigation.  Healthcare is made up of a diverse 
group of businesses that attempt to provide patient care efficiently in the 
face of vast amounts of regulation.220  Therefore, healthcare businesses 
should not face non-safety regulation in excess of any other types of 
businesses.221  Haphazard regulation of data mining is an example of how 
healthcare regulation has the potential to increase inefficiencies.222  
Moreover, state legislatures should be more concerned with incompetent 
prescribers who prescribe drugs merely because they were advertised to 
them, and not on the basis of a sufficient, medically valid diagnosis.  
Curtailing data mining firms is not a way to correct this more serious 
underlying problem. 
The question then becomes how to efficiently limit pharmaceutical 
data mining firms from allegedly interfering with prescribers and possibly 
increasing healthcare expenditures.  A potential solution is a cultural opt 
out policy.  For example, if a physician’s practice is affected by 
 218. This is due in part to the aging of the American population coupled with the policy 
debate concerning healthcare financing.  See, e.g., Centers For Disease Control and 
Prevention, Public Health And Aging:  Trends in Aging—United States and Worldwide, 
available at http://www.cdc.gov/MMWR/preview/mmwrhtml/mm5206a2.htm (stating that 
“[i]n the United States, the proportion of the population aged ≥ 65 is projected to increase 
from 12.4% in 2000 to 19.6% in 2030”); Lawrence D. Brown, The Amazing Noncollapsing 
U.S. Healthcare System, 358 NEW ENG. J. MED. 325, 325-27 (noting that the “U.S. 
healthcare costs have been in crisis for roughly 40 years . . . for several reasons, including 
administrative overhead, high payments to providers and the practice of defensive 
medicine”). 
 219. Note that even the First Circuit Court of Appeals commented that the New 
Hampshire statute “may not accomplish very much.”  Ayotte, 2008 U.S. App. LEXIS 23701, 
at *60. 
 220. Editorial, An Unhealthy Burden, ECONOMIST, June 28, 2007, available at 
http://www.economist.com/finance/displaystory.cfm?story_id=9407716 (subscription 
required) (indicating that as a result of federal and state regulation, the United States 
approach to healthcare regulation results in a “massive drag” of $169 billion annually). 
 221. It can be argued that healthcare is different from other businesses, namely due to the 
asymmetric information qualities inherent in the healthcare industry.  However, this is 
hardly an argument for preventing an efficient dissemination of pharmaceutical information 
from reaching physicians by sales representatives. 
 222. See, e.g., Jonathan Klick & Thomas Stratmann, Diabetes Treatments and Moral 
Hazard, 50 J.L. & ECON. 519, 537 (2007) (demonstrating how a diabetes mandate regulation 
creates an inefficient moral hazard situation where “the passage of diabetes benefit 
mandates worsens the health of diabetics relative to non-diabetics within mandate states”). 
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pharmaceutical sales representatives and the physician does not wish to see 
them, the physician should opt out by informing the sales representatives 
that they are not welcome in his or her office.223  If enough doctors become 
upset at the pharmaceutical industry’s advertising model, a culture of 
defiance will be directed towards pharmaceutical sales representatives, 
which in turn will cause the pharmaceutical industry to respond by 
advertising in an alternative way.  However, the fact is that most 
prescribers tolerate pharmaceutical sales representatives because of the 
education provided concerning new therapeutic options and the provision 
of free drug samples to hand out to patients.  It should be further noted that 
pharmaceutical companies have already begun moving away from directing 
their marketing efforts to prescribers despite an unwise regulatory attack on 
the business of pharmaceutical data mining.224  In short, only social norms 
within the medical and pharmaceutical community itself, not overzealous 
and arguably unconstitutional regulation, will be truly effective in 
preventing the alleged bombardment of sales representatives that 
physicians supposedly encounter. 
 CONCLUSION 
Data mining has been occurring in one form or another in many 
industries without many consumers realizing it.  Data mining firms are 
continuously responding to marketplace demands225 by developing more 
powerful information-collecting technologies.  However, a backlash may 
occur as more and more consumers become aware of the information that 
data mining firms collect.  Data mining firms may be viewed with 
contempt as consumers realize they are being specifically targeted due to 
information collected from their economic activities.  However, it is naïve 
to think that the actions of pharmaceutical data mining firms can be 
significantly curtailed without impinging on the First Amendment or 
making the healthcare marketplace less efficient.  As a result, state 
 223. There is already evidence that this is happening without any regulation.  See SK&A 
Patient Access Survey Press Release (Feb. 10, 2009), available at 
http://www.skainfo.com/press_releases.php?article=71 (indicating that between June and 
December of 2008, physicians who forbid sales representative visits rose from 22.3% to 
23.6% and physicians requiring sales representatives to make appointments rose from 
31.4% to 38.5%).  As for prescribers that work in settings other than individual practices, 
particularly hospitals, a drug formulary can be strictly enforced or the hospital can opt out of 
pharmaceutical sales representatives visits, with the exceptions of specified times. 
 224. See Steiner et al., supra note 217, at 38 (describing how “the shift from the 
“physician-prescriber” to a “stakeholder-payer” model will make the ability to influence 
payers of paramount importance to pharmaceutical companies. It also will cause these 
companies to lessen, though not eliminate, their marketing efforts to physicians”) 
 225. This demand occurs due to the ever-increasing competition between firms and the 
resulting need to achieve as high a rate of efficiency as possible. 
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legislatures should not act rashly when responding to the public’s concerns 
about data miners.  Furthermore, state legislatures must be vigilant to avoid 
imputing a backlash against data mining firms that is not actually present.  
As legislatures try to strike an appropriate balance, it must be remembered 
that “our brilliant Constitution made us free enough to develop and 
democratize free-speech technologies so cheap and powerful they can now 
be controlled only by property rights and local culture.”226 
 
 226. Peter Huber, Smile, You’re On Googcam, FORBES, July 2, 2007, at 110. 
